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Contemporary debates on freedom of religion are based on the following premises: a) 
Human beings are born free, as unique individuals with distinct personalities shaped by natural and 
social influences; b)  human rationality, being the seat of human freedoms, is universal; c) Religion, 
and hence freedom thereof, might as well be relegated to the realm of individual consciousness. This 
explains the reference to “the freedom of consciousness and belief” in many international and legal 
documents. d) Therefore as an individual human right, freedom of religion, consisting of one’s right 
to uphold any belief, dogma, conviction or practice, must be protected against external coercion and 
interference of any sort.  
 So, the question arises as to the nature of freedom of religion; does it belong inside or 
outside the realm of human rights? It appears that once a religion is perceived from a majority 
perspective, it is positioned outside and, hence, falls under the political rights - and if it is perceived 
from a minority perspective or from the point of view of the latecomers to a country, it is positioned 
inside. It comes easier for some adherents of different religious traditions to try to devalue all the 
“other religions” in a spirit of competition for influencing public opinion rather than focusing on 
the common issues facing all religions alike. Freedom of religion is unquestionably one of these 
issues at stake now.   
In this paper, I intend to provide a short analysis of the philosophical perspectives developed 
by some Muslim philosophers on the question of freedom of religion. Since freedom of religion is a 
social and first-order political issue, it must be dealt with in the theoretical context of social and 
political philosophy. But contemporary philosophy has almost severed its ties with religion. To the 
modern view, philosophy involves rational reflection on the nature of things and religion is 
concerned with practices based on revealed doctrines which are presumably impervious to rational 
scrutiny. However, I will attempt to argue that freedom of religion can only be resolved by a 
philosophical perspective on truth, which was the nature of philosophy as understood by some 
Muslim philosophers, like Alfarabi and Avicenna. We cannot analyze freedom of religion within a 
single religious perspective, nor one philosophical perspective on modernity. The perspective of 
these Muslim philosophers of 10th to 13th century are relevant here because for them, philosophy 
was not just a rational discourse, as it is for us today, but also a matter of academic exchange or 
statements; it was about primarily ways involving ‘practice of spiritual exercises with the aim of the 
transformation of the self by the acquisition of wisdom.” 
 
Keywords: al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Practical truth, Muslim philosophy, Philosophy 
of religion, Negative freedom, Enligtenment, Freedom of religion, Hermeneutics of religion. 
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Issues Concerning the Definition of Freedom and Religion 
Hegel draws attention to ambiguities in the definition of freedom. For Hegel, since freedom 
has no content and it is an empty concept, there will be no definition of freedom from its substance 
or its negation. Only a literal meaning can apply to it.  
 “No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest 
misconceptions (…) as the idea of Freedom: none in the common currency with so little appreciation 
of its meaning.” (Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind 1971, 239). Little needs to be added to Hegel’s remarks, 
except that freedom is also confused with liberty. 
Common public usage, however, confounds the term ‘liberty’ with that of ‘freedom’ by 
defining it as the lack of restraint. It is in this common sense that freedom here only means political 
and social freedom. If one were to look for a clear definition of freedom or were to ask a series of 
questions designed to elicit a working definition of freedom in modern philosophy, the answer 
would most likely be in line with solid liberal individualistic terms. One of the modern philosophers 
who gives such a liberal individualistic definition is Isaiah Berlin. In his Two Concepts of Liberty, he 
argues that “we should not confuse freedom with every good thing, such as a decent income and life 
chances. Everything is what it is, and not something else. Freedom means lack of restraint.” Berlin 
calls it “negative liberty”. For him, this is a bad definition because the definition focuses on the limits 
of one’s actions. “To know my freedom,” writes Berlin, “I have but to ask how many doors are open 
to me, and how wide they are open. The rest is extension of this sense, or else metaphor.” (Berlin 
1969, lvi) 
Defining freedom of religion is not simple either, rather more complex and complicated. 
The issue is primarily related to human beings, it is about human freedom in its relation to having 
certain beliefs and acts intertwined together in what we call religion. From the psychological 
perspective, we need to define our subject matter in terms of a) freedom of will, b) freedom of 
thought, c) freedom of expression c) freedom of worship d) freedom from coercion and e) moral 
freedom of personal development and f) freedom of reason.  
How will we define freedom of religion by emphasizing positive freedoms in the sense 
freedom “of, to and for” holding beliefs about God, the meaning of life, and of nature? Or should 
we define it negatively as freedom from, for instance, oppression by individuals, by society or by 
means of political order itself etc.? Can one measure freedom or lack of it against rational truth 
itself? These questions are all relevant to the issue of freedom of religion.  
We also need an operative definition of religion that will be applicable to the freedom of 
diverse adherence of religions. The premises on which the contemporary debates on freedom of 
religion are based are the following: a) All human beings are born free. b) Societies are made up of 
individuals with unique and distinct personalities, by a social contract for the pursuit of common 
good. c) However, natural and social influences shape the individual behavior and social order. d) 
The reason is the inborn universal faculty that all human beings share. e) The only reliable source 
and the boundary of human freedoms is individual conscience and the laws of a society. c) Religion 




and, hence, freedom thereof might as well be protected by laws and yet it must be relegated to the 
conscience of individuals -hence the references to “freedom of belief and consciousness” in most 
international legal documents; d) Therefore, as an individual human right, freedom of religion 
consisting of individual’s right to uphold any belief, dogma and conviction and practice thereof 
must be protected against external coercion and interference of any sort. If not all, but the 
fundamentals of these premises depends on the tacitly accepted logical fallacies, but this is not our 
concern here. However, it should be noted that these premises are sublimated as the basic tenets of 
modernity.     
The fallacy we will remark in passing consists of the tautological assumption that as if 
individual consciousness is a jar of cookies received as a gift, one can eat without opening the 
container. While in almost all academic circles, on which the psychology’s scholarship is based, firm 
theories presuming it to be an unquestionable fact that from early on the human conscience is 
shaped to a greater extent by the individual response to all sorts of external factors such as nature, 
family, and social environment. Can we, then, still talk about an individual consciousness left intact 
and able to be protected by the law, when individuals reach the legal age? These kinds of legal 
statements are fallacies in the sense that atheists such as Dawkins declares a legal battle for protection 
of underage children’s conscience from parental religious influence and deleting all religious 
reference to children of all age, i.e. reference in the international and national documents as 
Buddhist, Muslim or Christian should be cleared. So, the parent should have no right or privilege 
to teach their children any religion or faith of their choice. 
The second fallacy is related to a form of tacit classification of individual’s freedom into two 
kinds: freedom of interior and exterior actions. Freedom of conscience, thought and belief is related 
to an individual as a person, whereas freedom of expression is related to an individual as a member 
of society. This is important because depending on our definition of ‘religion’ it could be related to 
social and, therefore, political freedoms or to individual freedoms as an interior act of conscience.  
So, the next question arises as to the nature of freedom; is freedom of religion interior or 
exterior to human action - that is religious action (assuming that there was a category called action)? 
It appears that since religion itself is subject to multiple interpretations so is the realm of its 
freedoms. Recent legislative acts and initiatives in several countries of Europe, for instance, have 
been interested in understanding the belief system, conduct and dress codes of Muslims. Ever since 
the controversies about the representation of the Prophet of Islam in literature, visual arts or media 
(particularly with the Salman Rushdie affair) several experts and observers have tried to suggest ways 
to regulate people’s religious actions, interior and exterior. So, freedom of religion definitely falls 
under the rubric of political and social rights.   
   
Negative Freedom in Modernity 
If we define ‘freedom’ in negative terms as lack of restraint, we are delimiting it in its social 
sense. Individualist definitions mostly refer to the liberties, i.e. satisfaction of desires of body and 
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intellect. The end for which these desires are to be fulfilled is left squarely ambivalent. For this 
reason, our search for satisfactory answers to these questions in modern philosophy may be in vain; 
we may need to look for answers elsewhere. Half a century ago, a Muslim scholar Ismail Ragi A. 
Faruqi gave a lecture to the faculty of the Divinity School at the University of Chicago, on April 30, 
1964. His subject was “History of Religions: Its nature and significance for Christian education and 
The Muslim-Christian Dialogue.”  
The title makes it clear that collaboration between different faith groups in teaching each 
others’ religion in fairness to its own tradition was a promising educational project at the time. 
However, attempts of this kind did not bring the projected results. Instead, freedom of religion is 
getting more and more threatened in many parts of the world, even in the countries that used to be 
the cradle of freedoms. The unquestionable issue at stake now is not “freedom in abstracto” but 
more concretely freedom of human beings living in a society, a community and a certain country. If 
philosophy is primarily a way of questioning human life situations, then all the challenges 
threatening not only freedoms but also foundations of human societies would be the starting point 
of a meaningful discussion. After all, we are all responsible for engaging constructively with the 
problems facing the cohesion of our modern plural societies.  The problems related to the freedom 
of religion cannot be resolved within an antiquated conceptual framework. In the face of increasing 
xenophobia, racial and religious hatred, intellectual responses to these kinds of social crisis across 
the world seems not only inadequate but obviously less than promising in terms of expectations of 
harmonious social life.  
Therefore, as a starting point for a fruitful discussion, I will look at the critical response to 
Faruqi’s lecture by Charles H. Long, who was a professor of History of Religions at that time. Long 
writes this in his note: 
 
 Faruqi's portrayal of the history of the discipline of religions presupposes that such discipline was 
carried out along rational lines of scholarship. However, such judgment may not be totally accurate. 
The history of religion is a child of the European enlightenment. This is to recognize that the history 
of religion had its beginnings in a period in which the Western World was seeking some rational as 
over against a religious understanding of the history of man's religious life. The history of religion 
during the enlightenment was for the most part rationalistically and moralistically oriented. Prior to 
this time, the understanding of religion from a religious point of view yielded even less on the level 
of scientific understanding, for while the medieval theologians were able to see Islam, for example, 
as a religion and not as an instance of a truncation of reason, it was nevertheless relegated to the level 
of paganism since it did not meet the standards of the one true revelation. The rationalistic 
interpretation of history had the value of establishing a criterion other than revelation as the basis of 
religion. This meant that to a greater degree the data of the non-Christian religions could be taken a 
bit more seriously. This was further validated by the idea of universalism of the enlightenment and 
the reports from colonizers and missionaries which established a broader if inadequate basis for the 
understanding of other religions and cultures. (Faruqi 1965, 50, n. 16) 
 




The reason I mention these remarks is that the question of religious freedoms cannot be 
resolved within the parameters of post-Enlightenment philosophy.  It may appear to be a 
compliment to modernity or even to Christianity if one makes a mystical interpretation of these 
kinds of remarks which were in the spirit of the time no more than a lip service not only to the “so-
called enlightened sections of modern society” but also to the religiously sensitive ears. 
Enlightenment is neither really the culmination and manifestation of Christian rationality, nor can 
it serve as a good ground for understanding what is the true nature of freedom of religion but only 
feeds the self-gratification of modernity. 
It is true that history of religions did not tread a clear-cut rational course. 
It is also true that medieval attempts to understand any other religion from the perspective 
of one’s own religious tradition have proven their own fallacies, too. But it would be hardly a fair 
judgment if one were to claim that only post-Enlightenment reason has given rise to an appreciation 
of inter-religious tolerance. By giving due credit to its contribution to the development of the 
science of comparative religion, one should not forget that the Enlightenment has also exhibited 
uncompromising hostility towards and skepticism about religion. 
The idea of freedom has changed as it became to signify a formal sense, as freedom from 
tradition and authority.  In the Enlightenment, freedom is understood as a rational choice which 
one cannot obey tradition without using judgment.  As Descartes and Kant have shown, nothing 
could be acceptable if one knows and freely assents to it.  Kant described moral decisions other than 
derived from autonomy reason as heteronymous.  Romanticism, in opposition to the 
Enlightenment trust in the absolute power of reason, has changed the conception of freedom under 
the influence of natural and empirical sciences.  
For different reasons treatment of religion underwent a substantial change. According to 
Morris Jastrow, at the turn of the 20th century, these changes affected the methods of study of 
religions in Western tradition in seven categories: indifference, superiority, intolerance under the 
form of suppression and persecution, then comes the era of skepticism which followed a period of 
hostility towards all religions. Then comes the period of historical treatment of religion ending in 
the comparative study of religions. (Jastrow 1902, 1-22) 
This skepticism of the Enlightenment affected Christianity more than other religious 
traditions by severing philosophy from practical wisdom of religions and metaphysical wisdom on 
truth leaving and subjective hopes of individual mind. The question which now arises is this: In 
retrospect, by making the object of human will its own self-regulating reason, did philosophical 
enlightenment give man his own freedom or make it an object determined by the forces of nature? 
In other words, have individual human beings discovered the inner source of their freedom in “self-
regulating reason” at the expense of losing spiritual and moral freedom of self-realization ever since?  
 
Some Muslim Philosophers’ Approaches to Freedom  
For some of the major Muslim thinkers, like Alfarabi, freedom is a human faculty or potency 
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not only to the satisfaction of desires of the body, but also of spirit and mind, and human dignity in 
his social milieu. The end for which human beings are born free is towards completion or 
attainment of happiness and excellence of individual self, as well as social. To will something means 
that the subject is devoid of the object of his will. For an agent, having a purpose signifies that he is 
in need of fulfillment through the object aimed at.  
It is entirely fair to say that Muslim philosophers emphasize freedom of will more strongly 
than, say, Enlightenment philosophers, like Kant. For Kant, freedom should be defined on its own 
term and could only be understood in terms of its contrary, i.e. the lack of freedom. Therefore, for 
Kant, freedom is its own negativity. What we call a deficiency in being human or being in need of 
fulfillment is the evidence of something beyond human substance, as Averroes would have said.  
According to Ghazali, the discovery of freedom in human beings begins with the recognition of 
what is already known. These words sound contradictory at first. But in a close analysis, it is clear 
that the deficiency or the perfection of which a human being finds himself lacking leads him to the 
desire of what is already known. Ghazali declares that “agent is an expression referring to one from 
whom the act proceeds, together with the will to act by way of choice and the knowledge of what is 
willed.” (Al-Ghazali 1997, 57) The existence of freedom requires the performance of an action 
which is motivated by the will of something lacking or by its benefit which is already known. 
Therefore, it is understood as “the will seeking after something known” by the willing subject. “If 
then, a quest is supposed without knowledge, there would be no will” (Al-Ghazali 1997, 179) 
There are three Islamic terms to be treated in relation to the concept of freedom: liberty, 
choice, and will. In modern usage, probably the Arabic term hurriyya means both liberty and 
freedom interchangeably. But it was not commonly in use in philosophical treatises, except in Abu'l-
Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s later usage of the term in referring to Aristotle’s definition of freedom: 
“[Aristotle] said that freedom (al-hurriyya) is a faculty of soul protecting itself substantively not 
artificially. Again he says that freedom belongs primarily to substance and secondly it does not 
belong to habits” (al-Baghdādī, 1998, 279-280) That means freedom is not acquired through 
actions and habits but is the inborn quality of human substance. In other words, freedom is 
understood through actions of human agents aimed at self-protection, but it cannot be reduced to 
these habits.   
The concept of freedom has a moral and even an aesthetic sense. Some Muslim writers, for 
instance, Thanawi gives a literal definition of freedom as “antiquated and released” and adds that it 
also means “unsurpassable beauty and fairness.” But he also gives a better meaning to the term as 
“pure or sincere. The term freedom means sincerity of wisdom as it appears in man to separate the 
truth from other than itself.” (al-Tahanawi, 1996, 121) This is also the philosophical definition of 
freedom. He, then, continues to give a mystical definition of freedom, as “relieving the memory 
from being occupied with things other than the word of God.” It should also be mentioned that 
“freedom is the ultimate end of servitude, in which there is salvation just like at the beginning of his 
creation.” In another definition, freedom means in general sense release from desire, and in a special 




sense, it means release oneself from desire and put his will to the truth. (al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Taʻrīfāt, 
1983, 86) 
Human will is a potency which will be free only through knowledge and deliberation. By 
reason and by free choice, human will becomes free. The agent is the one who causes some other 
thing “to pass from potency to actuality (...); this actualization occurs sometimes from deliberation 
and choice (ihtiyar.)” (Averroes’ Tahafut Al-Tahafut 1987, 89) A similar definition of freedom in 
relation to human act is also made by Ala al-din al-Tusi, who is referring to free will as “an attribute 
of human being in a state of relatedness to act or not to act whose exact fulfillment is freedom that 
is not compulsory, yet a requisite of it.” (al-Tusi, Tahafut al-Falasifa, 2003, 169) 
How are these philosophical and theological definitions related to freedom of religion? 
These are also definitions of human nature. But whilst the human body, being subject to natural 
causes is not free, the human soul, and hence its highest faculty of intellect, is free. The power that 
makes human being human -that is to say a combination of the two components is the free will. But 
the question about free will is something different in theological or philosophical perspective.  
Let’s take another example of definition by al-Ghazali; when he defines freedom from a 
theological perspective, he is more cautious in his choice of words. The will is attributable to the 
discernment of something from its like; so, without having such a faculty we would have left only 
with potency.  At first sight, it appears as if al-Ghazali is making a concession to the philosophical 
doctrine of freedom of will. But he carefully avoids crossing the theological line and instead tries to 
give a literal definition of the term free will.  
Al-Ghazali, who represents some form of theological orthodoxy and mystical outlook, is 
critical on philosophical and other theological doctrines of freedom. Early on, some Muslim 
theologians, especially the rationalist Mutazilate School, emphasized the human reason's capacity to 
distinguish what is morally right and wrong. They also uphold the existence of free will, a human 
capacity to make a moral choice between what is right and what is wrong. Inspired by the Quranic 
advice that “among themselves, mankind should strive to compete in the good deeds”, Mutazilate 
School was convinced that reason and freedom were secure bases to establish moral and political 
order, leading to common good and justice in a plural society. However, they did not follow their 
own conviction when members of Mutazilate school held some political power for a short period of 
time; soon, not only they turned into very harsh critics of other religions but also they began to 
resort to oppressive ways to compelling other Muslim scholars to accept their doctrines. They left a 
historically bad legacy on the issue of freedom of religion, since they maintained that it cannot be 
dealt with theological reason alone.  
Therefore, the question of the freedom of religion, in general, cannot be resolved in 
theological discourse because it inevitably evokes doctrinal debates. Questions regarding the veracity 
or truth of one religion against another cannot be resolved by theological reasoning alone. Within 
the dogmas of a specific religion, we cannot solve the problem of religious freedoms and it must be 
carried into the realm of philosophical reason.  
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Freedom of Religion as a Political Issue in Alfarabi 
So far, I have argued that questions concerning the nature of freedom of religion or religious 
freedoms cannot be evaluated within the limits of modern philosophical discourse nor in theological 
discourse. We have to return to a so-called pre-modern understanding of philosophy or a way of 
doing philosophy in order to deal with the question in its own true features. Alfarabi’s political 
philosophy is the right place to start.  
In his influential work on the division of science, Alfarabi deals with the subject of the role 
of reason in religion. He describes three distinct approaches prevalent in his days. This same 
discussion is still relevant today. 1. One group claims that religion reveals truth above and beyond 
the reach of reason. Hence religion is a phenomenon to be reckoned with in its own terms, since 
reason cannot judge the content of religion. 2. The other group argues that religion not only 
comprises itself but also it is complementary to reason, that is to say, religion brings us certain ideas, 
some of which conform to reason and others are beyond the reach of reason. In other words, religion 
concurs with human rationality to a certain extent and opens a new horizon that elevates the human 
capacity. 3. This group argues that religion and reason lead to the truth from different paths. If there 
appears to be a contradiction, there remain two possible ways to resolve this conflict. Alfarabi 
suggests the philosophical method. The religious text should be revised in order to be understood 
correctly and/or rational knowledge is to be reviewed. Despite of this, the contradiction is still not 
resolved and the final solution would be to interpret the religious expression by means of rational 
knowledge. The other way to resolve the conflict is by denying the existence of a contradiction 
between religion and reason; if it is claimed to be a fact, philosophers should attribute it to either 
ignorance or bad intention of the claimant. Since reason is taken as the vehicle of truth, reason will 
judge the truth of the matter in case of conflict between two competing claims.  
We may call this Muslim perspective as a philosophical moralist and rationalist approach to 
religion.  Let’s not forget that Averroes defines philosophy as the “rational inquiry into the existing 
things and their contemplation in so far as they are proofs of the Creator.” (Ibn Rushd 2001, 3) It 
is a philosophical perspective that allows one to be open to the truth for moral and intellectual 
development within one’s own religious tradition. Alfarabi is aware of the diversity of religious 
opinions and narratives, both in ancient literature and also in his own social circles. He was aware 
of what Carlos Fraenkel calls “cultural religious forms” (Fraenkel, 2012, xii), seen as reading 
practices:  
 
[T]he myths, stories, histories of peoples and histories of nations, that man narrates and to which he 
listens solely for the pleasure they give. For to take pleasure in something means nothing other than 
the achievement of comfort and delight. Likewise, looking at imitators and listening to imitative 
statements, listening to poems, and going over what one comprehends of the poems and the myths 
he recites or reads, are used by the man who delights in them and is comforted by them only for his 
pleasure in what he comprehends. The more certain his apprehension, the more perfect his pleasure. 




The more excellent and perfect in himself the man who comprehends the more perfect and 
completes his pleasure in his apprehension. (Alfarabi 1961, 73) 
  
All people share this religious freedom that belongs to individual morality and that is part 
of his spiritual development. However, there is also a freedom of religion that relates to the political 
sphere, where the forms of good social life and social order are to be determined through 
philosophical analyses of human purposes in regard to the conception of ontological truth. In other 
words, the final question concerning the common good could only be established by an appeal to 
rational truth, not by the particularities of any religion. This may sound as if Alfarabi had projected 
secular social order where no single living religion dominated the public sphere. This was not the 
case, for Alfarabi, just as he believed the unity of philosophy depended on the universal human 
intellect, so, he equally believed in the universality of Islam as a complementary final form of all.  
 However, this idea of Islam as final closure of all truth never led to intolerance or hostility 
towards other religions. Although there was awareness of other belief systems openly in opposition 
to Muslim doctrine, this may not have been an excuse for violating the individual rights to life, 
property, honor, and reason of non-Muslims whose protection was determined by the divine 
purpose in Islamic revelation. Therefore, just like his own Muslim contemporaries, Alfarabi may 
have believed in the primordial status of Islam as well as in the finality of revelation contained in the 
Qur’an and revealed to the last Abrahamic Prophet, Muhammad. Therefore, religion is not 
understood in generic terms; rather it is perceived within the framework of both natural reason and 
philosophical perspective.  
Philosophy for them was supplementary to religion. Moral order, providing the means for 
peace in society and for the individuals, needs to be tested rationally in order for the moral and 
political regimes to achieve the objectives in the very formation of societies. The reason Muslim 
philosophers have treated religious freedom as a political issue has to do with the fact that human 
freedom is limited only by common laws and reason. Al-Kindi has also made a distinction between 
the eternal truth and the truth of cognition; between “ultimate truth and practical truth.” 
(Khadduri, 1998, 104). For al-Kindi “the truth requires that we do not reproach anyone who is even 
one of the causes of even small and meagre benefits to us.”(al-Kindi, 1974, 57) Some political issues 
may not be resolved according to the assertion about the eternal truth, but according to rational 
statements.  As Avicenna points out, every individual and social human order is limited by two 
bonds: “Divine law and law of reason”. This statement applies to religious freedoms as well. 
Commenting on the purpose of divine commands Avicenna writes: 
 
There may also be a gain to the one who is subject to penalty, in preventing him from further 
wickedness, because men must be bound by one of two bonds, either the bond of the divine Law or 
the bond of reason, that the order of the world may be completed. Do you not see that if anyone 
were let loose from both bonds the load of wickedness he would commit would be unbearable, and 
the order of the world's affairs would be upset by the dominance of him who is released from both 
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bonds? (Hourani 1966, 25-48) 
 
 If we try to set the doctrinal limits to religious freedoms, this would violate both God’s 
purpose in creation as well as divine justice that must be reflected in any social order. People could 
be brothers in many senses: brothers in blood, brothers in religion and brothers in humanity. This 
is the content of a well-rehearsed prophetic tradition that most Muslims may be familiar with.  
As in Ibn Tufail’s Hayy Bin Yaqzan, the philosophical truth to which reason can attain is 
the same as the one symbolized by the religion itself. Ibn Tufail’s elder Spanish contemporary, Ibn 
Bajjah, known to Europe as Avempace, was the author of a work called Tadbir al-Mutawahhid, i.e. 
The Hermit’s Regime. Ibn Bajjah’s theme was to demonstrate how man, by the unaided 
improvement of his faculties, may attain to union with the Active Intellect. So, freedom of religion 
in their public manifestations is an issue to be ordained by the laws, but the question of truth of 
opposite religious claims can be settled only in the light of truth, as it is reflected in the human 
intellect. Until the ultimate truth is attained, the door to self realization of each person of will is 
always open.  
I would like to end this reflection with the following questions. What “is the wisdom born 
out of religion? Is religion complementary to wisdom? Isn’t philosophy the exterior form of the 
human soul, while religion is the interior form thereof?” (al-Tawḥīdī, 1929, 200). In order to open 
ourselves to these questions, we must recognize the new role to be played by a rational and 
philosophical debate. There are four prisons that modern human beings are capable of emancipating 
themselves from Nature, society, history and from themselves. Probably the road to freedom from 
nature has been prepared by the evolution of natural knowledge. Critical reason and democracy may 
help us free ourselves from the burdens of history and society. Yet, who may free us from the prisons 
of self, or in Freud’s term, the ego? “It is the eye so long as it can see what is behind the mountains/ 
It is reason as long as it knows what will the future hold for it.”1 What happens if the eyes can't see, 
and reason cannot foresee what will the future hold? A man-made crisis of an unprecedented sort 
will be created by our own hands. This will be the crisis of freedom. Although it is the most abstract 
of all freedoms, as recognized in legal documents, freedom of religion gives rise to a concrete crisis 
of human identity, if it is violated.  
 
Endnotes 
1. From Tonyukuk, an ancient Turkic Bilge or sage (born c. 646, died c. 726). 
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